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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Advo, Inc. sued appellee Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. ("PNI") charging that PNI attempted to     
monopolize the market for delivering preprinted advertising 
circulars in the greater Philadelphia area, in violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.  Advo 
alleged that PNI has offered predatorily low prices to major 
purchasers of services for delivering circular advertising, and 
that, in light of specific features of the market, PNI's scheme 
to force Advo from the market has a dangerous probability of 
succeeding. 
 After extensive discovery, the district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of PNI.  Because we concur that PNI 
  
could not have recouped the investment in predation it might have 
made, and because Advo failed to present evidence that could  
support a finding that PNI either priced below cost or had a 
specific intent to monopolize, we will affirm. 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 A.  Factual Background 
 1.  General Features of the Market for Retail                
Advertising 
 Before presenting the specific facts of this case, we 
find it useful to provide general information on the relevant 
advertising markets.  Until recent decades, grocery stores, 
discount stores, hardware stores, and other large retailers 
promoted their goods primarily through newspapers.  They used two 
kinds of advertisements.  Those appearing directly on newspaper 
editorial pages are called "run of press" ("ROP") advertising.  
Separate pieces of paper included with the newspaper (e.g. 
supermarket multi-page ads) are called "circulars" or 
"preprints."   
 Retailers found newspaper advertising wanting in two 
ways.  First, it provides only limited "penetration" into an 
area's households.  For example, in Philadelphia the major daily 
newspapers reach only 25.4% percent of the households and even 
the Sunday paper reaches only 49.1%.  Second, newspaper 
advertising cannot focus on specific neighborhoods within a large 
metropolitan area.  To give a concrete example of both of these 
shortcomings, a supermarket chain understandably wants its 
  
advertisements to reach every household within close proximity to 
its stores.  Newspaper advertising, be it ROP or preprint, cannot 
provide such targeted saturation coverage. 
 In response to these shortcomings, literally hundreds 
of "marketing communications" services ("MC services") have 
sprung up over the last 30-odd years.  Taking advantage of 
comprehensive computer databases containing the addresses of 
every household in a region, they have been able to provide 
almost complete penetration in delivering advertising materials, 
be it in an entire metropolitan area or within, e.g., specific 
zip code areas.  These services, of course, deliver only 
preprints since they do not publish any sort of newspaper.  The 
dispute in this case involves the delivery of print advertising 
for retailers targeted at consumers within a metropolitan area. 
 MC services deliver either by United States mail or by 
hiring delivery people to walk door-to-door and hang bags of 
preprints on doorknobs.  The former is often called "shared 
mail"; the latter is known as "alternate delivery."  Some costs 
are common to both methods; e.g. computerized mailing lists, and 
labor to stuff preprints into packets and sort the packets in 
order of delivery.  Alternate delivery involves other significant 
fixed costs.  In addition to hiring delivery persons and planning 
their routes, management must employ a second tier of "verifiers" 
to perform spot-checks and ensure that delivery employees simply 
are not dumping their packets into the first available dumpster. 
 Because mail rates increase with the weight of the 
advertising packets, alternate delivery becomes attractive, 
  
despite these high fixed costs, as an MC service attracts more 
customers.  Once delivery and verification staff are in place, 
the incremental costs of adding more advertising material to the 
packet are minimal. 
 To cover the high fixed costs of alternate delivery, or 
even the lower but still significant fixed costs incurred in mail 
delivery, MC services need "base players" that distribute large 
numbers of circulars on a routine basis.  Supermarket chains, 
which depend on multi-page weekly circulars to attract shoppers, 
are one of the most important types of base players.  Large 
discount chains, such as K-Mart, also play this role.  There are, 
of course, only a small set of such base players in a given 
metropolitan area. 
 
            2. Advo and the Philadelphia Market for Preprint                     
Advertising 
 Advo is a national MC services company and is the 
largest full-service direct mail marketing company in the 
country.  It distributed at least three billion advertising 
packages in 1992, generating nearly a billion dollars in revenue.  
Advo began operating in the eight-county area that comprises the 
Philadelphia market1 in the mid-1960s, and appears to have grown 
                     
1
.  The parties stipulate that the relevant geographical market 
in this suit consists of the following eight counties: 
Philadelphia, Bucks, Montgomery, Chester, and Delaware counties 
in Pennsylvania; Camden, Burlington, and Gloucester counties in 
New Jersey.  This is the same area as the Census Bureau's 
Philadelphia Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
  
rapidly since obtaining the Acme supermarket chain as a base 
advertiser for shared mailings in 1983. 
 Ironically, Advo faced a Sherman Act section 2 suit as 
a result of capturing the Acme account and expanding its business 
in Philadelphia.  Cassidy Distrib. Serv. v. Advo-Sys., Inc., No. 
84-3464 (E.D. Pa. 1984).  A small competitor that previously had 
serviced Acme sued Advo charging predatory conduct in furtherance 
of a plan to monopolize the market for distributing advertising 
circulars in the region.  In the course of countering this 
charge, Advo argued that there are few, if any, barriers to 
entering the business of marketing communications, and thus there 
is little, if any, chance that a predator could recoup the costs 
of illegally obtaining a monopoly.  See app. at 1772-1908, 2317-
2340, 2341-2348. 
 The market for circular advertising distribution 
appears to have become more competitive in recent years.  When 
Advo changed its delivery schedule in 1989 to accommodate Acme, 
other major customers became dissatisfied and invited CBA, a MC 
services company from outside the area, to enter the Philadelphia 
market.  Despite start-up costs of over $3,000,000, CBA turned a 
profit within 14 months.  In a move admittedly taken to avert a 
"price war," Advo acquired CBA's Philadelphia preprint 
distribution operations in 1992.  This acquisition apparently 
encountered no antitrust scrutiny. 
 
 
  
 3. The Effect of Marketing Communications Services on       
Major Philadelphia Newspapers, and Their Response 
 Much of Advo's growth has come at the expense of PNI, 
publisher of the Philadelphia market's major daily newspapers, 
The Philadelphia Daily News and The Philadelphia Inquirer.  PNI 
estimates that it has lost at least $4,000,000 per year in ROP 
and circular advertising to Advo and similar competitors. 
 To counter Advo's advantages in market penetration and 
the ability to target specific neighborhoods, PNI in 1991 began 
working on a "total market coverage" ("TMC") program to 
supplement ROP advertising with alternate delivery to non-
subscriber households.  PNI started implementing the program in 
small stages by 1992.  Although it faced substantial start-up 
costs, PNI claims that it hoped to turn a profit on its TMC 
program by 1995. 
 Facing the same cost structure as Advo, PNI needed a 
base player to help cover the high fixed costs of delivering 
preprinted advertising packets door-to-door.  In September 1992, 
and again in January of 1993, PNI offered to distribute circulars 
for the Super Fresh supermarket chain, a major Advo customer, for 
about $30 per thousand circulars.  As part of its proposal, PNI 
offered discounts on ROP advertising tied to the total volume of 
advertising that Super Fresh purchased.  Advo retained the 
account by cutting its rate by about 37%, from $58 to $36 per 
thousand circulars.  Thus, Super Fresh retained Advo despite its 
base rate exceeding that in PNI's proposal by about 20%.  
Although the expert opinion testimony is conflicting, there 
  
appears to be no factual basis to Advo's claim that PNI's 
proposed prices were below its costs.  There is also no support 
for Advo's claim that PNI tendered Super Fresh prices below those 
offered to comparable advertisers. 
 PNI made similar efforts to wrest the accounts of Acme 
and Fleming Foods supermarkets, Bradlees department stores, and 
Circuit City consumer electronics stores from Advo; in each case 
Advo retained the accounts after cutting its rates substantially.  
In fact no major account has switched from Advo.  Thus, it is 
clear that to date PNI's activities have been pro-competitive, as 
they have resulted in lower prices. 
 
 B. Procedural History 
 Advo filed its complaint against PNI on June 17, 1993, 
alleging that PNI was engaged in a predatory pricing scheme 
designed to achieve a monopoly over the Philadelphia market for 
circular and ROP advertising in violation of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.  Advo requested damages, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15, and injunctive relief, 15 U.S.C. § 26.  The district court 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Advo's antitrust 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (interstate commerce jurisdiction). 
 The parties undertook extensive discovery, including 
deposing at least 30 of each other's corporate officials as well 
as other industry experts.  Each side presented expert economic 
analysis.  In addition, the eight-volume appendix, running to 
  
over 2300 pages, includes relevant documents such as business 
plans, annual reports, and internal memoranda. 
 After reviewing this voluminous record, receiving 
extensive briefs, and hearing oral argument, the district court 
on June 13, 1994, granted PNI's motion for summary judgment on 
the antitrust claims.  Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc., 854 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  The court found that 
even if it accepted, arguendo, that PNI had engaged in predatory 
conduct with specific intent to monopolize, there was no 
dangerous probability that PNI could achieve a monopoly and 
maintain it long enough to recoup the costs of predation.  The 
court reaffirmed its decision in response to Advo's motion under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for reconsideration on July 15, 1994.2 
 On August 11, 1994, Advo timely appealed from the 
district court's order of summary judgment and from the order 
denying the motion for reconsideration.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 II.  Discussion 
 A.  The Standard for Summary Judgment 
 1.  Predatory Pricing Suits in Particular 
 For its case to survive PNI's motion for summary 
judgment, Advo had to show that there is a "genuine issue as to 
                     
2
.  Because these rulings disposed of all federal questions in 
Advo's complaint, the court exercised its discretion and 
dismissed without prejudice a supplemental state law tort claim 
for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.  
  
[a] material fact" that, if decided in its favor, would legally 
entitle it to prevail on its attempted monopolization claim.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-54 (1986).  The Supreme Court's 
decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986), led some to believe that 
there was a special summary judgment standard for antitrust cases 
in general, or for predatory pricing cases in particular.  In 
Matsushita, the Court reversed this court and held that we erred 
in reversing a summary judgment which the district court granted 
to the defendants in a predatory pricing suit.  Expressing 
skepticism about the rationality of predatory pricing schemes, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that "if the factual context renders 
[an antitrust plaintiff's] claim implausible-if the claim is one 
that simply makes no economic sense-[the plaintiff] must come 
forward with more persuasive evidence to support [its] claim than 
would otherwise be necessary."  Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 
(citations omitted). 
 Other language in the opinion, however, demonstrated 
that the Court grounded its reasoning in the general standard for 
summary judgment under Rule 56.  "Where the record taken as a 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial," id 
(internal quotations omitted).  See also Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230-
32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993).  If there was 
  
any doubt about the matter, the Court settled it in Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992): 
 
 The Court's requirement in Matsushita that 
the plaintiffs' claim make economic sense did 
not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs 
facing summary judgment in an antitrust case 
. . . . Matsushita demands only that the 
nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in 
order to reach the jury, a requirement that 
was not invented, but merely articulated in 
that decision.  If the plaintiff's theory is 
economically senseless, no reasonable jury 
could find in its favor, and summary judgment 
should be granted. 
 
 In its most recent predatory pricing case, the Court 
indicated that summary judgment will be appropriate in a host of 
specific contexts.  "In certain situationsfor example, where 
the market is highly diffuse and competitive or where new entry 
is easy, or the defendant lacks adequate excess capacity to 
absorb the market share of his rivals and cannot quickly create 
or purchase new capacitysummary disposition of the case is 
appropriate."  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993).3 
                     
3
.  While the plaintiff in Brooke Group alleged "primary line" 
price discrimination under the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), the Court made clear that 
such price discrimination was factually identical to predatory 
pricing and thus that the analysis in the opinion applies as well 
to predatory pricing suits under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
 [P]rimary-line competitive injury under the 
Robinson-Patman Act is of the same general 
character as the injury inflicted by 
predatory pricing schemes actionable under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act . . . [T]he essence of 
the claim under either statute is the same: A 
business rival has priced its products in an 
  
 Matsushita caused some confusion because it in effect 
created a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that 
predatory pricing is unlikely to threaten competition.  The 
Court, citing a long list of scholarly works, found that "there 
is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes 
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful."  Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 589, 106 S.Ct. at 1357; see also Brooke Group, 113 
S.Ct. at 2589 (citing this passage from Matsushita).  In a 
nutshell, economic analyses stress that (1) predatory pricing, 
unlike collusion or merger, involves an expensive "investment in 
predation," since presumably the predator will have to price 
below costs; (2) this investment must be more than offset by 
discounted future monopoly profits; and (3) the ability to 
(..continued) 
unfair manner with an object to eliminate or 
retard competition and thereby gain and 
exercise control over prices in the relevant 
market. 
 
  Accordingly, whether the claim alleges 
predatory pricing under § 2 of the Sherman 
Act or primary-line price discrimination 
under the Robinson-Patman Act, two 
prerequisites to recovery remain the same. 
 [1.] [prices] below an appropriate measure of 
a rival's costs . . . 
 [2.] a demonstration that the competitor had 
a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of 
recouping its investment in below-cost 
prices. 
 
Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2587-88. 
 
 Advo could not make a claim under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, since the Act applies only to commodities and not services 
like advertising. 
  
maintain a monopoly for long enough to recoup an investment in 
predation is uncertain, since supracompetitive prices will 
attract new entrants (or returning competitors).4 
 Empirical studies support these theoretical insights.  
While it once was believed widely that turn-of-the-century 
"robber barons" commonly practiced predatory pricing to eliminate 
competitors, research over the last few decades has exposed this 
                     
4
.  Some recent work has demonstrated that predatory pricing may 
be viable in a limited number of special situations.  See, e.g., 
Jonathan Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic 
Perspective, 62 Antitrust L.J. 585 (1994). 
 
 Baker provides a typical situation where predatory 
pricing might work: 
 
 Suppose a chain store faces a non-chain rival 
in each of a large number of towns.  The 
chain cuts its prices drastically in a few 
towns.  When the chain's rivals in those 
towns either exit or begin to compete less 
aggressively with the chain, the price war 
ends and high prices are restored.  In 
addition, the chain store's rivals in all the 
other towns, in which the chain did not cut 
prices, also respond by avoiding aggressive 
competition with the chain.  As a result 
prices also increase in the towns in which 
predation did not occur. 
 
Id. at 590.  Predation makes economic sense in such cases because 
the predator needs to make a relatively small investment (below-
cost prices in only a few markets) in order to reap a large 
reward (supracompetitive prices in many markets). 
 
 Advo, however, has made no argument that PNI's 
predation is anything like this special case where price 
predation is economically sensible.  This is probably because the 
facts of this case do not fit under such a theory.  PNI competes 
in only one market, and Advo presents no evidence that PNI's 
parent, Knight-Ridder Corporation, is using Advo as an example 
for competitors it faces in other markets. 
  
belief as a myth.  For instance, a seminal article demonstrated 
that John D. Rockefeller invariably used mergers, and not 
predatory pricing, to lessen competition in the oil industry.5 
 Based on this combination of economic logic and 
empirical verification, the Court has concluded that "economic 
realities tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-
deterring:  unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust 
laws, failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the 
conspirators."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595, 106 S.Ct. at 1360.  
"[I]f [the alleged predators] had no rational economic motive to 
conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally 
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an 
inference of conspiracy."  Id. at 596-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1361.6 
 Erroneous jury verdicts for plaintiffs in predatory 
pricing cases pose a unique threat.  "[C]utting prices in order 
to increase business often is the very essence of competition.  
                     
5
.  John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil 
(N.J.) Case, 1 J. Law & Econ. 137, 168-69 (1958).  See also 
Morris Adelman, A&P: A Study in Price-Cost Behavior and Public 
Policy (1966) (showing that national supermarket chain did not 
engage in predatory pricing to eliminate local rivals); Kenneth 
G. Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 
13 J. Law & Econ. 223, 240 (1970) (showing that gunpowder 
manufacturers did not use predatory pricing to achieve monopoly 
power).  The Supreme Court has cited approvingly the empirical 
work of McGee and others, Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1357. 
6
.  Matsushita involved alleged predatory pricing conspiracies 
among a group of oligopolistic defendants.  Nevertheless, the 
Court in Matsushita expressed equal skepticism about the 
plausibility of predatory pricing by a single defendant.  "These 
observations apply even to predatory pricing by a single firm 
seeking monopoly power."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590, 106 S.Ct. 
at 1357 (emphasis in original). 
  
Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are 
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
594, 106 S.Ct. at 1360.  "[C]ourts should not permit factfinders 
to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, 
because the effect of such practices is often to deter 
procompetitive conduct."  Id. at 593, 106 S.Ct. at 1359.  We 
cannot ignore the danger of chilling competition in this case, 
since PNI's acts clearly have benefited consumers, in the short 
run at least, with lower prices.  There are antitrust problems 
only if PNI has the intent and the power to harm these consumers 
in the long run. 
 
 2. Burden on Advo in General 
 The United States, in its amicus brief, claims that we 
stated in Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1262 
(1993), that summary judgment is inappropriate where plaintiffs 
have "advanced even a 'mere scintilla' of evidence" in support of 
their theory of recoupment.  Br. at 12.  This statement perplexes 
us as it misstates the holding in Big Apple.  The relevant 
passage in Big Apple explicitly requires more:  "if the opponent 
[to a summary judgment motion] has exceeded the 'mere scintilla' 
threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then 
the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against 
the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far 
outweighs that of its opponent."  974 F.2d at 1363 (emphasis 
  
added).  See also Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1230.  In keeping 
with Rule 56(c) and Celotex, we clearly stated in Big Apple that 
a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment unless it can produce 
more than a "scintilla" of factual support for their theory of 
legal recovery. 
 To summarize, then, in order to establish a "genuine 
issue" that entitles it to reach trial on its attempted 
monopolization claim premised on predatory pricing, Advo must 
present more than a scintilla of evidence that the alleged 
predatory conduct makes economic sense.  In this appeal, the main 
hurdle for Advo is to show that PNI reasonably could expect to 
recoup an investment in the predatory pricing of distribution of 
circular advertising. 
 
 B. Elements of Predation 
 "[I]t is generally required that to demonstrate 
attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct 
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power."  Spectrum Sports, Inc. 
v. McQuillan, 113 S.Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993).  See also Barr Labs. 
Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98, 112 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
district court assumed arguendo that Advo had demonstrated that 
there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding the first 
two elements of its attempted monopolization case:  predatory 
conduct, in the form of predatory, below-cost pricing; and 
  
specific intent to monopolize.  It nonetheless found no dangerous 
probability that PNI could achieve monopoly power. 
 While we concur with the district court's conclusion, 
see § II.B.3 infra, we first examine Advo's evidence on predatory 
conduct and specific intent.  We find that Advo failed to produce 
evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on any of the 
three elements of its attempted monopolization claim against PNI. 
 
 1. Below-Cost Pricing 
 "[P]redatory pricing means pricing below some 
appropriate measure of cost."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584 n.8, 
106 S.Ct. at 1355 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Yet 
"[t]here is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the 
law reviews, about what 'cost' is relevant in such cases," id., 
and "[n]o consensus has yet been reached on the proper definition 
of predatory pricing in the antitrust context . . . ."  Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12, 107 
S.Ct. 484, 493 n.12 (1986).  The Supreme Court, however, recently 
reaffirmed that "the reasoning in both [Matsushita and Cargill] 
suggests that only below-cost prices should suffice, and [that it 
has] rejected elsewhere the notion that above-cost prices that 
are below general market levels or the costs of a firm's 
competitors inflict injury to competition cognizable under the 
antitrust laws."  Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2588.  In Brooke 
Group, the Court accepted for the purposes of the case the 
parties' agreement to use average variable cost, but "again 
  
decline[d] to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over 
the appropriate measure of cost."  Id. at 2587 n.1. 
 Under microeconomic theory, the most important measure 
is marginal cost - the cost of producing each incremental unit 
of output.  As long as a firm's prices exceeds its marginal cost, 
each additional sale decreases losses or increases profits.  Such 
pricing is presumably not predatory. 
 Like many economic abstractions, marginal cost is 
difficult to measure.  The most widely cited approach to dealing 
with this problem, Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory 
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 716-18 (1975), divides costs into two 
categories: fixed costs that do not vary with the level of output 
(e.g. interest on borrowings, insurance premiums), and variable 
costs that do vary with the level of output (e.g. overtime wages, 
electricity bills, material costs).  Because it is practically 
impossible to calculate the portion of variable costs 
attributable to each additional unit of output, Areeda and Turner 
argue that courts should use average variable cost as a proxy for 
marginal cost. 
 Regardless of the measure of a defendant's costs on 
which a plaintiff premises a predatory pricing claim, a plaintiff 
cannot anchor its case on theoretical speculation that a 
defendant is pricing below that measure.  Indeed, "[a]s a 
practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-
cost pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that 
rational businesses would not enter into conspiracies such as 
  
this one."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584 n.8, 106 S.Ct. at 1355 
n.8 (emphasis added).7 
 Despite extensive discovery, Advo apparently is unable 
to produce any direct evidence that PNI offered to distribute 
circulars at prices below any relevant measure of cost.  As a key 
step of his analysis, Advo's economic expert states that 
"[a]verage variable costs for [PNI's TMC program] were 
estimated."  App. at 1630 (emphasis added).  The basis for these 
estimates is weak.  For instance, with no more foundation than a 
statement by PNI's publisher that inserting circulars involves 
"extensive costs," the expert concluded that PNI "potentially 
vastly understated" this variable cost.  Other components of the 
expert's cost estimates similarly lack a factual basis.  
 As Brooke Group makes clear, expert testimony without 
such a factual foundation cannot defeat a motion for summary 
judgment.  "When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient 
facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable 
record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion 
unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict . . . .  Expert 
testimony is useful as a guide to interpreting market facts, but 
it is not a substitute for them."  Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 
2598.  Advo failed to present facts establishing a genuine issue 
over whether PNI priced circular advertising distribution 
                     
7
.  As we explain in note 6 supra, the Court's use of the word 
"conspiracy" here in no way limits the application of this 
language to Sherman Act section 1 cases. 
  
services below some measure of costs.  This omission provided 
sufficient grounds for granting summary judgment. 
 
 2. Specific Intent to Monopolize by Predation 
 In addition to demonstrating predation, plaintiffs 
alleging monopolization under section 2 must produce intent 
evidence.  Courts sometimes infer specific intent directly from 
proof of below-cost pricing.  Inasmuch as Advo failed to create a 
genuine issue over pricing, however, it needed to prove specific 
intent by other means.  Its two attempts, based on (1) statements 
in internal PNI documents, and (2) PNI's alleged targeting of 
Advo's key customers, are not sufficient to withstand PNI's 
motion for summary judgment. 
 Antitrust plaintiffs often establish specific intent 
with "smoking gun" documents that articulate antitrust scienter 
in no uncertain terms.  Advo found no such documents; instead, it 
attempted to cut and paste unrelated and innocent clauses 
together to produce guilty declarations.  To take one example, 
Advo misrepresents that PNI's TMC Business Plan states that: 
 
 [T]he 'ultimate benefit' of the TMC program 
was that PNI would be the 'one-stop buy,' 
i.e. the only competitor left, in the eight 
county Philadelphia market when rates would 
become 'upwardly adjustable.' 
 
Appellant's Br. at 24.  The phrases "ultimate benefit" and "one-
stop buy" do occur in the same sentence in the plan, app. at 738, 
and correctly portray PNI's overall objective.  The phrase 
  
"upwardly adjustable," however, comes eight paragraphs later, 
app. at 739, as the discussion progresses from an overview of the 
plan to the nuts and bolts of various hypothetical business 
scenarios.  PNI used the phrase "upwardly adjustable" in a 
scenario in which it assumed that prices "are deemed to be very 
competitively set . . . ."  This is a far cry from an admission 
that it was charging predatory prices to start with, or that it 
planned to charge monopolistic prices in the future. 
 Advo officials themselves have used aggressive-sounding 
language.  Its CEO, Robert Kamerschen, once directed his managers 
"to seize the OPPORTUNITY inherent in the stumbling PROBLEMS of 
the newspaper industry," and quoted McDonald's founder Ray Kroc 
for the advice that "[w]hen [you] see the competition drowning, 
. . . stick a water hose down their throats."  App. at 459. 
 The antitrust statutes do not condemn, without more, 
such colorful, vigorous hyperbole; there is nothing to gain by 
using the law to mandate "commercially correct" speech within 
corporate memoranda and business plans.  Isolated and unrelated 
snippets of such language "provide no help in deciding whether a 
defendant has crossed the elusive line separating aggressive 
competition from unfair competition."  Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 
1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989).  We thus conclude that nothing quoted 
from PNI's internal documents displays PNI's specific intent to 
monopolize the market for distribution of circular advertising. 
 Advo's claim that PNI's "targeting" of its key accounts 
demonstrates such specific intent is similarly unavailing.  As we 
discussed supra § I.A.1, circular advertising distributors need 
  
"base players," that advertise frequently and on a large scale, 
to cover their high fixed costs.  Inasmuch as there are 
relatively few base players in the Philadelphia market, any firm 
competing in the market for distribution of circular advertising 
necessarily would try, as a first step, to wrest one or more of 
these large accounts away from Advo.  PNI's proposals to Advo's 
largest customers are exactly what we would expect from a 
legitimate competitor.  That such behavior also might be 
consistent with predation does not mean that Advo can survive 
PNI's motion for summary judgment.  "If [seemingly predatory] 
conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, 
the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy."  
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1361. 
 
 3. Dangerous Probability of Recoupment 
 Finally, we concur with the district court's 
determination that Advo failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact about PNI's ability to recoup any investment made 
in predation (§ II.B.3.a infra).  The Supreme Court instructs 
that "[i]f market circumstances or deficiencies in proof would 
bar a reasonable jury from finding that the scheme alleged would 
likely result in sustained supracompetitive pricing, the 
plaintiff's case has failed."  Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2589.  
The district court found, in effect, that "[t]he evidence is 
inadequate to show that in pursuing this scheme, [PNI] had a 
reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-cost 
pricing,"  id. at 2592.  We agree. 
  
 In addition, we reject Advo's theories that PNI can 
scare away potential entrants by "strategic deterrence" 
(§ II.B.3.b infra), or can "leverage" its monopoly over ROP 
advertising to gain a monopoly over the distribution of circular 
advertising (§ II.B.3.c infra).  Finally, we find no support for 
Advo's theories for how PNI could recoup an investment in 
predation via either price discrimination (§ II.B.3.d infra) or 
long-term contracts (§ II.B.3.e infra). 
 
  a. Low barriers to entry 
 For the purposes of this section, we accept the 
contention that PNI is pricing below cost, with specific intent 
to obtain a monopoly in the distribution of advertising 
circulars.  We further assume, arguendo, that it will be able to 
complete successfully the first stage of its plans by eliminating 
Advo and all other competitors from the Philadelphia market.  
But, as we discussed supra § II.A, in order to defeat the motion 
for summary judgment Advo must demonstrate that PNI has a 
dangerous chance to recoup the losses it necessarily would incur 
in pricing below cost. 
 If it is easy to enter the circular distribution 
business, PNI's scheme is doomed to failure:  any attempt to 
recoup by charging supracompetitive prices after it has gained a 
monopoly simply will attract new (or old) distributors who will 
undercut PNI and force prices back down to competitive levels.  
Predatory pricing schemes that fail at the recoupment stage may 
injure specific competitors like Advo, but do not injure 
  
competition (i.e. they do not injure consumers) and so produce no 
antitrust injury.  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-90, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697 (1977).  Such 
futile below-cost pricing effectively bestows a gift on 
consumers, and the Sherman Act does not condemn such inadvertent 
charity. 
 In deciding that low barriers to entry would defeat any 
attempt by PNI to recoup an investment in predation by raising 
prices, the district court properly analyzed the specific 
features of the Philadelphia market for circular advertising.  
"In order to determine whether there is a dangerous probability 
of monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the 
relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy 
competition in that market."  Spectrum Sports, 113 S.Ct. at 891. 
 We do not see the difficulty of entering the business 
of assembling and distributing bags of advertising circulars, 
whether by mail or door-to-door.  The inputs required are readily 
available: a small cadre of experienced managers; a sales force; 
computerized address lists available from a variety of vendors; 
and a large number of low-skill employees to stuff circulars into 
packets, and then either to stuff them into newspapers or hang 
them on doorknobs. 
 Nobody has a monopoly over any of these commonly-
available goods and services.  Managers with experience in the 
circular advertising distribution business are probably the 
scarcest of the requirements, but if Advo exited the Philadelphia 
market, a new entrant might be able to hire its local management 
  
team.  The Supreme Court has observed that driving a competitor 
out of business may do no more than allow a new entrant to buy up 
the idled physical and human capital at bargain prices.  See 
Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119 n.15, 107 S.Ct. at 494-95 n.15.  In any 
event, the business involved here hardly is of a highly 
sophisticated nature. 
 High capital requirements also pose no barrier to 
entry.  The total start-up investment, based on CBA's successful 
entry into the Philadelphia market, is a couple of million 
dollars.  While this sum is not trivial, it is not so high that 
it would prevent new competitors from jumping in if PNI tried to 
charge supracompetitive prices.8 
 Advo itself made substantially all of these points in 
defending against a similar claim ten years ago, Cassidy Distrib. 
Serv., supra § I.A.2.  According to Advo's expert in that case, 
"[e]ntry into the market [for distribution of circular 
advertising] is comparatively easy.  Little initial capital is 
required relative to many other businesses.  Mailing lists and 
operational expertise are available from many sources."  Revised 
Preliminary Report of Dr. Almarin Phillips, app. at 2345.9  In 
                     
8
.  It is also noteworthy that Advo may have deeper pockets than 
PNI.  Although it is difficult to extract financial information 
for PNI from the annual report of its parent corporation Knight-
Ridder, we can ascertain that Advo's revenues in 1992, 
$910,000,000, were more than double those of PNI, $422,000,000.  
While it is true that Knight-Ridder's 1992 revenues, 
$2,300,000,000, were in turn more than twice those of Advo, 
Advo's theory of recovery focuses exclusively on the PNI 
subsidiary. 
9
.  Advo has not objected to PNI's reliance on Phillip's report 
on the possible ground that the report was not admissible 
  
addition, Advo's expert in the Cassidy case noted two other 
sources of competition.  First, advertisers, individually or as a 
group, could form their own circular distribution ventures if a 
monopolistic vendor raised prices significantly.  Second, 
unconventional shared mail vendors, such as utilities and credit 
card companies that send out bills every month, would become more 
attractive if conventional sellers overprice their services. 
  Advo tries to distance itself from its position in 
Cassidy by arguing that conditions in the Philadelphia market 
have changed in the intervening years.  While Advo arguably shows 
that CBA might be unable to repeat its 1989 entry today due to 
increased competition and PNI's altered delivery schedule, it 
fails to undermine any of the observations it made in Cassidy: 
the business is simple, capital requirements are not excessive, 
and there are a variety of ways to compete in the market for 
distributing circulars. 
 Although Advo did not mention "know-how" or credibility 
in the Cassidy case, it now claims that these factors present 
significant barriers to entering the circular distribution 
business.  We agree with the district court that these arguments 
are unconvincing.  In the words of Advo's economic expert, the 
know-how barrier stems from "the substantial efforts that must be 
undertaken to obtain the necessary business . . . the experience 
required for ensuring the delivery of preprinted advertising to 
(..continued) 
evidence on the motion for summary judgment and thus we do not 
address that question. 
  
over 2,300,000 households on a weekly basis (on a given day of 
the week), and coordinating the logistics associated with 
ensuring quality control and customer satisfaction."  App. at 
1615. 
 Oddly, Advo claims that the complexity of PNI's TMC 
Plan proves that know-how is a significant barrier to entry.  To 
the contrary, the fact that PNI was able to plan and implement 
(according to Advo's pleadings) an effective plan in less than a 
year shows that entry into the circular distribution business 
does not require extraordinary know-how.  Beyond the bald 
assertions of its expert, that are without factual significance, 
Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2598, Advo presents no evidence that 
its business requires know-how any different from other 
businesses.  Indeed, the record indicates that circular 
distribution is relatively simple.  Tellingly, Advo cites only 
two dated district court decisions arguing that know-how can be a 
significant barrier to entry.10  In any event, the value of 
precedent on this point is limited, as the importance of know-how 
can be determined only in the context of a particular business. 
 Advo also emphasizes the need for a reputation for 
providing reliable service as a barrier to entering its business.  
This approach, however, proves too much.  New entrants and 
customers in virtually any market emphasize the importance of a 
                     
10
.  Marnell v. United Parcel Svc., Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 73,761 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.  Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 965 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978). 
  
reputation for delivering a quality good or service.  Federal 
Express had to establish a strong reputation for on-time delivery 
in order to create an entire new industry; because of its 
reputation McDonald's has flourished despite having numerous 
competitors.  The number of examples is extensive.    
 Advo's argument, without some limiting principle (that 
it fails to supply), implies that there are barriers to entry, 
significant in an antitrust sense, in all markets.  We find this 
proposition implausible and, moreover, precluded by Supreme Court 
precedent.  See Brooke Group, 113 S.Ct. at 2589 (suggesting 
summary judgment is appropriate in predatory price suits "where 
new entry is easy," implying that there are easy-entry markets); 
see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 591 n.15, 106 S.Ct. at 1358 n.15 
("Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the 
relevant market is especially difficult . . . .").  While we do 
not question the judgment of other courts of appeals that in 
other market contexts reputation is a significant barrier to 
entry,11 Advo has failed to create a genuine issue over the 
existence of barriers to entry in this case.   
 We also point out that the reputation may be of only 
marginal significance where there are only a limited number of 
                     
11
.  See Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 
1566, 1577 (11th Cir. 1191) (finding "goodwill," a partial 
synonym for reputation, could be barrier to entry in real estate 
listings market), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 295 (1992); U.S. 
Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (finding that "the need to have a well-known brand with 
wide consumer acceptance" amounted to a barrier to entering the 
market for rotary electric shavers), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068, 
109 S.Ct. 2070 (1989). 
  
consumers for a service as is the case here.  After all, a new 
entrant need only convince a few businesses to use its services 
for it to be successful in the circular distribution business.  
Thus, this case differs from a situation in which the competitors 
seek their customers in a large retail market. 
 Assessing barriers to entry is not an easy task.  In 
the ideal world of neoclassical economics, the implicit 
assumption is that there are no such barriers.  Of course in real 
world markets this assumption never holds and new entrants face a 
variety of hurdles.  The question is, how far from the economic 
ideal do the special features of a given market take us?  We 
agree with the district court that neither know-how nor 
reputation make entry into the market for distributing circular 
advertising so difficult that PNI could charge supracompetitive 
prices for a significant period of time.  Thus competition would 
prevent PNI from recouping the cost of predation.  In the next 
four subsections, we explain that "strategic entry deterrence," 
PNI's monopoly power in the ROP market, its ability to engage in 
price discrimination, and its use of supposedly long-term 
contracts do not alter this conclusion. 
 
  b. Strategic entry deterrence 
 The idea behind "strategic entry deterrence" is that a 
monopolist who pursues predatory pricing with sufficient zeal and 
frequency will earn a reputation formidable enough to scare off 
all potential entrants indefinitely.  The firm then can charge 
monopolistic prices long enough to recoup its investment in 
  
predation.  Like Advo's arguments that know-how and reputation 
create barriers to entry, its strategic entry deterrence theory 
sweeps too broadly.  Without some limiting principle, it would 
bar summary judgment in every predatory pricing case, a result at 
odds with Matsushita and Brooke Group. 
 As a matter of economics, ease of entry makes the 
threat implicit in strategic entry deterrence non-credible.  
Potential competitors will realize that at some point the 
predatory firm will be unable or unwilling to charge below-cost 
prices and absorb further losses, since nobody's pockets are 
bottomless.  High prices will attract a stream of competitors who 
eventually will sap the predator's bank account. 
 
  c. Leveraging ROP market power 
 PNI alone distributes newspapers across the entire 
Philadelphia market, and we assume that it has a monopoly over 
ROP advertising in the metropolitan area taken as a whole.  Advo 
claims that PNI offered discounted ROP rates to customers placing 
circulars in its TMC program.  Advo argues that such "leveraging" 
of existing monopoly power in an attempt to gain monopoly power 
over a related market amounts to anticompetitive conduct in 
violation of the Sherman Act. 
 While such leveraging arguments have long been a staple 
of antitrust suits, they have come under increasing attack as 
economically groundless.12  They appear to be based on analysis 
                     
12
.  Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 372-73 (2d ed. 1993); 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 10.10 (4th ed. 
  
akin to the myth that a monopolist can charge any price it wants.  
That, of course, is not true; an exclusive seller will raise 
prices only to the point where the higher price is not more than 
offset by a decrease in quantity demanded.  The shape of the 
demand curve constrains the behavior of all sellers, even 
monopolists. 
 Similarly, leveraging arguments like Advo's imply that 
a monopolist somehow magically can multiply monopoly power in one 
market into monopoly power in two markets.  This makes no sense.  
PNI's monopoly in the Philadelphia market for ROP is worth so 
much a year, say $X.  The simplest way for PNI to exploit this 
monopoly is to set ROP price and output levels so that its 
supracompetitive profits on ROP advertising are $X.  Advo alleges 
that instead, PNI is lowering the price of ROP advertising (and 
thus raising quantity) in an attempt to gain circular advertising 
business.  In the extreme, it is possible that PNI could charge 
competitive prices for (and produce a competitive quantity of) 
ROP advertising, and use the entire value of its ROP monopoly to 
increase its circular market share. 
 The question is, what would PNI accomplish by such a 
strategy?  Even if it successfully monopolizes the circular 
distribution advertising market by investing the proceeds from 
its ROP monopoly in predation, it will be unable to recoup those 
profits as long as there are low barriers to entering the 
(..continued) 
1992); Richard Markovitz, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American 
Antitrust Laws, 80 Yale L.J. 195 (1970). 
  
circular distribution market.  Any attempt to earn back the 
foregone profits by charging monopoly prices on distribution of 
circular advertising, as we discussed supra § II.B.3.a, merely 
will lead to a wave of new entrants who will drive prices down to 
competitive levels. 
 The Supreme Court has recognized this point.  In 
Matsushita, the plaintiff American producers claimed that their 
Japanese competitors had a monopoly over the Japanese domestic 
television market and were using the profits derived in Japan to 
fund a predatory pricing scheme in America.  The Supreme Court, 
taking these propositions as true, found no antitrust problem 
since the defendants were unlikely to recoup their foregone 
profits: 
 
 Nor does the possibility that petitioners 
have obtained supracompetitive profits in the 
Japanese market change this calculation.  
Whether or not petitioners have the means to 
sustain substantial losses in this country 
over a long period of time, they have no 
motive to sustain such losses absent some 
strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy 
in this country will eventually pay off. 
 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593, 106 S.Ct. at 1359 (emphasis in 
original). 
 Even if we agreed that PNI somehow could multiply its 
monopoly power in the ROP market because of some unusual 
interdependency with the circular distribution market, there is 
little, if any, evidence that it attempted to use leverage.  The 
record shows that PNI simply offered discounts based on the total 
  
amount of advertising purchased by a customer.  PNI did not 
threaten to deny ROP service to customers that refused to place 
their circular distribution business with it, nor did PNI grant 
extraordinary discounts for customers of its TMC program.  PNI's 
discounts, based on the total amount of dollars spent by a 
customer, offend no antitrust principles.13  Such "total 
quantity" discounts distinguish this case from SmithKline Corp. 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 838, 99 S.Ct. 123 (1978), where we found that discounts tied 
to the purchase of specific items might amount to unlawful 
leveraging of monopoly power. 
 
  d. Price discrimination 
 Advo claims that PNI can recoup its investment in 
predation by charging high prices to small accounts, while 
retaining base players with lower, competitive prices.  It 
asserts that PNI's ability to retain base players with low (but 
above cost) prices will deter new entrants. 
 What Advo wishes to characterize as price 
discrimination is, again, nothing more than quantity discounting.  
A host of Advo assertions to the contrary are without foundation.  
Advo claims that "PNI does not afford non-base players such 
benefits," Br. at 22, but cites no record support.  It buttresses 
its assertion that "PNI further discriminates between base 
                     
13
.  Tellingly, Advo offers precisely the same kinds of 
discounts; e.g. customers who buy enough shared mail receive 
discounts on all other services purchased from Advo. 
  
players and non base players by giving the base players large 
discounts off the published price,"  Br. at 22, with no less than 
four cites to the appendix, but none of the cited material 
provides any real support.  Finally, Advo contends that "PNI 
offered the special ROP discounts only to Advo base players."  
Br. at 23 (emphasis added).  Although it gives three cites to the 
appendix, none remotely support this crucial assertion.  The 
record indicates that PNI offered quantity discounts to all 
customers on an equal basis.  Such common commercial practice 
does not offend the Sherman Act. 
 In addition, our ease of entry analysis, supra 
§ II.B.3.a, applies to small buyers as well as base players.  If 
PNI tried to charge supracompetitive prices to smaller accounts, 
we see no economic reason why new entrants could not successfully 
gain this business by charging lower prices.  Indeed, suburban 
newspapers are an existing source of competition for many local 
retailers, and most of these local publications have implemented 
programs to reach non-subscribing households.  We previously 
rejected Advo's theory of predation in Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 
108.  The plaintiff in Barr claimed the defendant was selling at 
low prices to big drug store chains, but charging more to smaller 
retail pharmacies.  We questioned the economic logic of this 
claim, noting that "competitors would step in with lower prices 
[to small retailers] to defeat Abbott's strategy." 
 
  e. Long-term contracts 
  
 We also find no merit in Advo's claim that PNI plans to 
monopolize the circular advertising market by signing long-term 
(two-year) contracts with base players.  We begin by noting that 
contracts to purchase are never per se violations of the 
antitrust laws, even in their most restrictive forms.  Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333, 81 S.Ct. 623, 
631 (1961).  The proposed two-year contracts were not highly 
restrictive; they were neither requirements contracts compelling 
buyers to purchase all of their circular advertising from PNI, 
nor did the offers contain exclusionary clauses barring 
advertisers from dealing with other vendors. 
 Moreover, there is clear evidence in the record that 
one- and two-year contracts are standard in the industry.  App. 
at 1616.  CBA, now owned by Advo, had a two-year contract with 
Super Fresh.  App. at 1965-66.  Indeed, in its brief, Advo flatly 
states that "[b]ase players typically purchase preprint 
distribution through long-term contracts of twelve months or 
more."  Br. at 22.  Since PNI's proposed contract length, two 
years, did not depart from standard industry practice, Advo in 
effect must be claiming that all distributors of circular 
advertising engage in exclusionary behavior by using long-term 
contracts.  It provides no support for this improbable 
conclusion. 
 We note also that base players are not small, 
unsophisticated entities likely to sign contracts of adhesion in 
favor of PNI.  They are major regional and national retailers who 
presumably do not enter into agreements unless the terms are in 
  
their interests.  These retailers have proved to be keenly aware 
of supracompetitive pricing for distribution of circular 
advertising, and explicitly have invited competitors to enter the 
market when they felt prices were excessive.  It is unlikely that 
they would agree to a deal that permitted PNI to sock it to them 
down the road. 
 While it is true that PNI internal documents discuss a 
desire to "lock up" base players with "multi-year" contracts, 
app. at 1137-38, this is merely another example of harmless 
commercial rhetoric that we discussed supra § II.B.2.  It is of 
no antitrust significance. 
 
 III. Conclusion 
 We close with the following observation.  There can be 
little doubt but that PNI's adoption of the TMC program has 
resulted in lower prices for distributing advertising circulars 
in the Philadelphia market.  Yet Advo would have us condemn PNI 
because of what Advo contends, without basis, will be the long-
range consequence of PNI's actions.  We reject Advo's argument.  
This case is a text-book example of a situation in which a 
plaintiff is, in the words of Matsushita, using the antitrust 
laws in an attempt to chill the very conduct the laws were 
designed to protect. 
 Accordingly, because the district court correctly 
determined that PNI had no reasonable prospect of recouping any 
investment made to obtain predatorily a monopoly in the market 
for distributing circular advertising, we will affirm its order 
  
of June 13, 1994, granting summary judgment against Advo and its 
order denying reconsideration on July 15, 1994.  As additional 
ground for affirming, we find that Advo failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact to support its case on the other 
two elements of its Sherman Act section 2 claims, predatory 
conduct and specific intent to monopolize.  Finally, we note that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 
state-law tortious interference with contractual relations claim 
once it had resolved all substantial federal questions in the 
case. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree with the court's conclusion regarding one of 
the case dispositive issues presented in this appeal.  Advo 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether there was a dangerous probability that PNI would recoup 
its alleged investment in predation.  I write separately because 
my reasons for reaching that result differ somewhat from those 
offered by the court. 
 Advo bore the burden of establishing a genuine issue of 
material fact on the recoupment issue.  To meet this burden, Advo 
attempted to show that various impediments to market entry or 
reentry would tend to keep potential competitors out of the 
  
market long enough for PNI to recoup its investment in predation 
through the charging of supracompetitive prices.  Advo's task of 
presenting a record that would permit a rational factfinder to so 
conclude was made substantially more difficult by PNI's evidence 
establishing that CBA, as recently as 1989, had successfully 
entered the market in well under a year during a period when no 
one was charging supracompetitive prices.  Advo attempted to meet 
the challenge presented by CBA's entry by pointing to evidence 
which tended to show that there are barriers in the market today 
which were not present when CBA entered the market.  
 Advo no doubt has presented facts from which a rational 
jury could infer that various market factors would tend to impede 
market entry or reentry.  Showing that various factors might 
impede market entry is not enough, however.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate here because Advo has failed to provide a rational 
basis for an inference that the various market-entry impediments 
are substantial enough to deter entry for a period sufficient to 
permit recoupment through the charging of supracompetitive 
prices.  
 Having concluded that Advo failed to meet its burden on 
the recoupment issue, I would not reach the issues of whether 
Advo met its burdens on the predatory-pricing or specific-intent-
to-monopolize elements of its § 2 claim. 
